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1. Introduction
From the vantage point of the naïve observer, the establishment
of a Palestinian state in the foreseeable future is highly likely.
First, in the 1950s and 1960s, the right of national self-
determination had become widely accepted not only in theory
but also to a high degree in practice as indicated by the worldwide
process of decolonization. There can be no doubt that a
Palestinian people exists since even Israel, which was reluctant
to approve this fact in the period between the start of the
occupation in June 1967 and the Oslo Peace Process in September
1993, officially recognized the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian
people in the “Declaration of Principles”. Moreover, there can
be no doubt that the occupation regime installed by Israel
contradicts the principle of national self-determination.
Second, there is a recent trend of global democratization. In 1974,
the “third wave”1 started with the “Revolution of the Carnations”
in Portugal and rapidly spread over most continents (indeed with
only one major exception, the Middle East). Moreover, with the
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States of
America (USA) as the only left superpower decided to put the
promotion of democratization on its foreign-policy agenda.
Although there is absolutely no guarantee that the establishment
of a Palestinian state would bring democracy and freedom to its
people, it is evident that Palestinian national self-determination
is a necessary precondition for such a development. Note that the
Palestinians were not granted the chance for a truly democratic
system by the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in
the course of the Oslo Peace Process. The reason behind this is
not the fact that the PA, which was elected in free polls in 1996,
actually established an authoritarian system. Rather, the very
1
 Samuel P. Huntington 1991: The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late 20th
Century, Norman, Okla.: Oklahoma University Press.
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architecture of the Oslo Peace Process contradicted basic
democratic principles since the Israeli occupation power preserved
the main components of sovereignty over the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, such as control of more than 50% of the territory,
borders, and foreign affairs. In other words, the political body
elected by the Palestinian people in democratic elections was
deprived of instruments which are essential for a democratic
system. To put it in a nutshell, prolonged Israeli occupation in
Palestine contradicts the global trend of democratization.
Finally, the Palestinians have not suffered the fate of some
“forgotten”, people whose potential right of self-determination is
more or less ignored by the international community, e.g. the
Sahrawis and the Kurds in the Middle East. As recently as March
15, 2002, with Resolution 1397, the United Nations’ Security
Council proclaimed the aim of establishing a Palestinian nation
state, something thus officially approved as an important goal of
the world community including the USA.
Thus, the optimism of our naïve observer that there will be a
Palestinian state soon is based on some good arguments. Yet, at the
same time, there are strong counter-arguments all of which are related
to the fact that Israel to date prevented all Palestinian efforts to grant
national self-determination to the Palestinians. Note the difference
between the terms “Palestinian State” and “national self-determination
of the Palestinians”. Although there are some exceptions, the
overwhelming majority of the political actors of Israel as well as its
people are not opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state as
such.2 The PA elite was forced to acknowledge the important
difference between founding a Palestinian state and the realization
2
 According to Ephraim Ya’ar’s and Tamar Hermann’s summary of a poll
conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center at Tel Aviv University in fall 2002,
58% of the Israelis would accept a Palestinian state negotiated with the Israeli
government (http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindex/2002/files/
nov2002e.doc, August 31, 2003).
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of Palestinian self-determination through the establishment of a viable
state, when Yasir Arafat discovered several times that his unilateral
announcement to proclaim a Palestinian state was not a menace to
Israel. Finally, Arafat refrained from doing so because Israel would
have simply recognized such a state in the borders of areas A (and
B), i.e. in the patchwork carpet already administered by the PA.
It is much easier to define what would not be a viable Palestinian
state than to determine what would be. A definition of a viable
Palestinian state based on objective criteria, such as “economic
independence” suffers from several shortcomings.3 On the one hand,
the resulting definition of a viable Palestinian state would be too broad
since, from an economic point of view, the control over the holy sites
of Jerusalem (Al-Haram Al-Sharif) would not be a major issue. Yet,
few Palestinians would agree to deal with the issue of the holy sites of
Jerusalem as a question of minor importance. The problem of this
finding can hardly be solved without introducing criteria lacking
objectivity such as “cultural viability”. On the other hand, at the same
time the resulting definition would be too narrow. It is doubtful whether
even a Palestinian state endowed with sovereignty over the whole of
East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip plus a land corridor
could ever enjoy economic independence in the strict meaning of the
term. Yet, there can be little doubt that the leadership of the PA and a
clear majority of Palestinians would accept such a political entity as
viable. Indeed, there are some examples of states that proved to be
viable although they could never survive without major external
funding, such as Jordan.
My conclusion from this brief discussion on the term viability is
that—in the present case—a subjective dimension must be part of
the definition. Obviously, two extreme points mark the ends on a
continuum of different Palestinian would-be states. The first extreme
3
 According to my knowledge, the first scholar who attempted to determine the
features of economic viability of a Palestinian state in a systematic way was
George T. Abed 1990: The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State, Washington,
D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies.
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point is a state comprising areas A (and B) which would be
considered by few, if any, Palestinians as viable. The other extreme
point is defined as a sovereign Palestinian state on the whole of the
Palestinian Territories conquered by Israel in 1967, which would
be considered by the leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian
people as viable. Between these two extreme points an indefinite
amount of potential Palestinian would-be states could be constructed
on the drawing board, some of which would be considered by the
Palestinian side as viable whereas others would not.
Possibly, the distinction between the establishment of a Palestinian
state and a viable state restrains the optimism of our naïve observer.
Yet, my assumption is that he or she will not yet have become
pessimistic. Therefore, it is my task to make clear as precisely as
possible what inhibits Israel and the PLO from agreeing upon a
political entity that would be considered as a viable Palestinian state
by the Palestinian side. Broadly speaking, the reason why by now
Israel has been reluctant to accept a viable Palestinian state is related
to differences in positions of Israel and the PLO on the territorial
extension and the degree of sovereignty for that state. Since Israel
has been prevailing over the PLO in the conflict for 36 years by
now, the first task of this paper is to clarify the structure of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, it must be analyzed what
means are at the disposal of Israel in order to counter the factors
making our naïve observer optimistic that a (viable) Palestinian state
will be established soon. To put it in a nutshell, we have to understand
the nature - or better, the basic structure - of the conflict between
the PLO and Israel as well as the latter party’s pillars of power
enabling it to prevail over the former. Since precision is of utmost
importance for this task, it will be based on mathematical tools as
provided by game theoretical insights (Chapter 2).
The second task of this paper is to ask what strategies are available
to the Palestinians to succeed in their aim of gaining statehood.
On the one hand, Israel’s success in preventing a viable Palestinian
state from coming into being is based on its superior power position
vis-à-vis the PLO. On the other hand, all past and present - and
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most probably all future - Palestinian strategies to achieve a viable
state have been based on the logic of challenging Israel’s superior
power capabilities. As a consequence of the fact that Israel enjoys
superior power capabilities particularly in terms of armed forces,
economics, politics, and diplomacy, the Palestinian side may try
to challenge Israel in one or several of these fields. In principle, in
all fields a radical or a moderate approach may be pursued. For
instance, in the field of diplomacy a radical approach would mean
that the Palestinian side would try to acquire power capabilities
balancing or even outweighing those of Israel. Yet, due to the fact
that the power gap between Israel and the PLO is extraordinarily
huge in this and other fields, actual past and present—and most
probably also future—strategies of the Palestinian side have
resorted to the moderate approach of reducing the relative power
gap vis-à-vis Israel. Palestinians have been attempting to take
advantage of the fact that superior power capabilities are not always
and under all circumstances applicable in dealing with a specific
conflict, i.e. control over resources does not necessarily equal
control over results. For instance, the fact that the European Union
sometimes prevails over the USA in trade conflicts is, among other
things, due to the latter party’s inability to use its superior military
capabilities in dealing with these conflicts. An obvious example
of the case to be analyzed here is that whatever kind of military
strategy the Palestinian side embarks on, Israel cannot use its
nuclear power arsenal to counter it (Chapter 3).
Although a general framework for strategies potentially available to
the Palestinians will be developed in chapter 3, detailed discussion
will be limited to strategies actually pursued by political actors in
Palestine. Thus, the final task of this paper is to discuss whether and
to what degree the Palestinian side has neglected potentially promising
strategies. The chosen perspective will draw attention to the fact that,
due to the huge power gap between the Israeli and Palestinian sides,
the latter party could try to make up for this disadvantage at least in
part by embarking on a comprehensive strategy, i.e. a way to combine
approaches challenging Israel’s superior power capabilities in more
than one field, thereby also triggering synergetic effects (Chapter 4).
Prospects for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State
12
2. The Structure of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
2.1 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a Graduated
Prisoner’s Dilemma
A conflict may be defined as a positional gap between two or
more actors on a certain issue. In the present case, Israel and the
PLO differ on the establishment of a Palestinian state. The best
way to understand the chances and obstacles for the actors of a
conflict in finding an agreement is to grasp the situation structure
of the conflict, which can be examined in a precise methodological
way by applying game theory. The situation structure is determined
by the combined preferences of the actors. In the present case,
the PLO aims at establishing an independent state on the whole
of the Palestinian Territories conquered by Israel in 1967, i.e. East
Jerusalem (Al-Quds), the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the
other hand, Israel insists, first, on maintaining its rule over more
or less extended parts of the Palestinian Territory, and, second, on
curtailing the sovereignty of the Palestinian State.4
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict as described above shares the
characteristics of a graduated prisoner’s dilemma.5 Although a
compromise is possible, actors exposed to this situation structure
will find it very difficult to reach an agreement. In order to
understand why, one should start with an examination of the
problems actors are facing in an “ordinary”—as opposed to a
graduated—prisoner’s dilemma. In an “ordinary” dilemma situation,
both actors would be better off if they cooperated (i.e. there would
be peace between Israel and Palestine) since the alternative is mutual
4
 Martin Beck 2002: Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und
politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag [Peace Process
in the Middle East. Rationality, Cooperation, and Political Rent], Chapter 4.
5
 See Duncan Snidal 1985: “Coordination Versus Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes”, in: American Political
Science Review 79.4, pp. 923-942.
Martin Beck
13
defection (e.g. the situation since Al Aqsa Intifada of using force
and counter-force). At the same time, both actors have strong
incentives not to cooperate for three reasons. First, they would prefer
to get the whole cake instead of sharing it (i.e. a sovereign Palestinian
state over all the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel in 1967
or prolonged Israeli occupation, respectively). Second, both actors
are hesitant to cooperate since they are scared that the other actor
will cheat on them (e.g. if the PLO accepted a demilitarized
Palestinian state in exchange for Israel granting military non-
interference to Palestine, Israel would be suspicious that Palestine
would nonetheless strengthen its military capabilities and Palestine
would be suspicious that Israel would take advantage of Palestine’s
military impotence by exerting physical power over it). Third, both
actors are hesitant to cooperate because they fear that the other could
use its benefits from cooperation in the future against it (e.g. Palestine
would be scared that Israel could use its improvement of relations
with the Arab World in order to marginalize Palestine; Israel would
be afraid that Palestine could use the advantages of statehood in
order to challenge the legitimacy of Israel in the future).6 Therefore,
it is difficult to reach an agreement in dilemma situations. Yet, since
non-cooperation inflicts harm on both parties, there is a certain
chance that they will succeed if they find ways to control their mutual
lack of trust (e.g. Palestinian demilitarization could be verified by
early warning stations and Israeli non-interference in internal
Palestinian affairs could be guaranteed by a powerful third actor)
and the problem of relative gains (e.g. Israel and the PLO could
agree upon a free trade zone, resulting in mutual harm if they used
resources against each other).
What makes an agreement in an “ordinary”—as opposed to a
graduated—prisoner’s dilemma much more likely to be resolved
is the fact that there is only one cooperative outcome in the former
6
 For the so-called problem of relative gains see Joseph M. Grieco 1988: “Realist
Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation. Analysis with an Amended
Prisoner’s Dilemma Model”, in: Journal of Politics 50.3, pp. 600-624.
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situation whereas several are possible in the latter. If the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict were an ordinary prisoner’s dilemma, it would
be sufficient for both parties to agree upon peace. An agreement
between Israel and the PLO would require much more than this.
Here, both parties must also agree on how exactly to divide several
crucial disputed items. To be specific, in order to achieve peace,
Israelis and Palestinians have not only to forego their most preferred
outcomes (i.e. unrestricted occupation and unconditional
withdrawal, respectively), but must also find common solutions
for complicated divisible issues, such as the degree of sovereignty
of a Palestinian state, the distribution of power over Jerusalem, the
dismantling or annexation of Israeli settlements and the question
of how many Palestinian refugees are allowed to settle where. Thus,
it would not be adequate for Israel and Palestine to only resolve
the problems of an ordinary dilemma situation, namely overcoming
their mutual lack of trust (“Will the other cheat on me?”) and the
issue of relative gains (“Will the other use its payoffs received from
cooperation in order to develop capacities to threaten me in the
future?”). They have also to resolve matters attached to a graduated
dilemma situation. The latter is much more complicated to deal
with peacefully since, contrary to the ordinary variant, there is not
one single cooperative outcome (“peace”) but several by which
the parties are privileged to different degrees (e.g. “All, some or
none of the Israeli settlements will be dismantled”). Consequently,
power, which does not play any role in an ordinary dilemma
situation because there is only one cooperative outcome, may
become decisive in a graduated dilemma situation.7
Since there is a huge power gap between Israel and the PLO, both
actors are “naturally” inclined to resort to positions mutually
excluding each other. Israel’s awareness of its superior power
7
 This is the reason why many popular Israeli descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict are restricted to the issue of peace, thereby obscuring the fact that Israel’s
superior power capabilities put it into the position where it can reject an agreement
that could otherwise be achieved.
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enables it to draw red lines, which it will not cross (in extreme
cases, not even for one single step), regardless of the quality of the
Palestinian arguments. At the same time, since the Palestinian side
is aware of its inferiority in terms of power, it tends to focus on
justice, which it will not give up (in an extreme case, not even one
single piece of it), regardless whether this results in a total failure
of an agreement. This point can best be demonstrated by the example
of the refugees issue. Many Israeli actors simply argue that the
“right of return” is not acceptable to Israel since it contradicts its
national interest, thereby ignoring the moral dimension of the issue
(although any outside observer with a tolerable degree of
impartiality can hardly ignore that innocent Palestinians were
victimized by Israel in the war of 1948/49). On the other hand,
many Palestinians simply insist on the “right of return”, thereby
ignoring the practical dimensions of the issue (although the same
outside observer faces major difficulties in understanding why it
should be attractive to a descendant of a Palestinian refugee from
1948 to live in Israel instead of getting compensated). In other
words, a major problem facing any Israeli-Palestinian agreement
is, first, how to tame the Israeli inclination to dictate an agreement
that reflects the power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinian
side as well as, second, how to convince the Palestinians to lower
their expectations of what could be considered fair under such norms
as condemnation of the occupation of foreign territory.
The description of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a graduated
prisoner’s dilemma does not exaggerate the problems of finding
an agreement. Possibly, on the contrary, some scholars may tax
me with over-optimism since on both sides, radical political actors
exist whose positions create a zero-sum game with virtually no
chances for reaching an agreement. On the Palestinian side, some
(or even many) Islamist groups are oriented towards the “liberation
of Palestine as a whole”, including Israel in the borders of 1949.
On the Israeli side, some (or even many) organizations of the
settlers’ movement are opposed to a Palestinian state in general.
However, I believe that both radical camps are in a minority
position and could hardly prevent the implementation of an
Prospects for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State
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agreement reached by the leaderships of the PLO and the
government of Israel. Yet, the growing political importance of
the two radical camps significantly intensifies the problem of
relative gains since both Israel and the PLO fear that one’s own
concessions could be used by the extremists of the other side
against one’s own interests in the future.
Two main preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the analysis
presented so far. First, the tricky structure of the conflict (rather than
idiosyncrasies of the parties) makes it very difficult to reach an
agreement between Israel and the PLO. Second, the power asymmetry
between the two parties creates mutually exclusive inclinations as to
how to deal with the conflict, thereby increasing the difficulties of
the two parties in managing it in a peaceful way. Moreover, the way
power matters in the conflict shapes Palestinian strategies, as will be
demonstrated in more detail in the following sub-chapter.
2.2 Pillars of Israeli Power vis-à-vis the Palestinian Side
One of the results of the previous sub-chapter is to clarify not
only that superior Israeli power capabilities matter in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict but also how. To have a precise idea of what
strategies are available to the Palestinians in their power game
with Israel, it is important to determine the pillars of Israeli power.
Social scientists have developed different concepts of the key term
“power”. Probably the most common concept is based on the
definition that an actor’s power equals the resources at its disposal.
If we apply this idea of power as “control over resources” to the
case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the result is very clear.
Israel is much more powerful than the Palestinians, regardless
which of the common criteria for power resources are chosen.
There can be no doubt that Israel’s economic, military, diplomatic
and political capabilities far outstrip those available to the
Palestinians. Israel is among the very few former developing
countries originally based on agriculture that managed to create
an advanced economy based on modern technology, which is why
its current per capita income is among the highest on the globe.
Martin Beck
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Moreover, Israel’s military apparatus is among the most modern
and efficient worldwide. Israel also enjoys a favorable diplomatic
position since it has been developing close ties with the USA since
1967. Finally, since Israel in the borders of 1949 is a democracy,
its political system is also among the most efficient worldwide.
In principle, there is an open list of fields in which Israel’s power
resources are superior to those available to the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, the elements presented here cover the most important
Israeli power resources, and certainly all those that played a major
role in the recent history of the Israeli-Palestinian power game.8
Yet, the concept of power as control over resources is not really
appropriate for the purpose of the present paper. Because my
contribution is supposed to focus on Palestinian strategies for national
self-determination, it must be taken into consideration that all
Palestinian efforts to establish a viable state are based on the logic
of preventing Israel from exerting its power capabilities to the full
degree. To give an extreme example, part of the logic in favor of
suicide attacks is that Israel, for humanitarian reasons, is not able to
respond to them by using all the resources at its disposal, e.g. sending
out its air force for area bombardment, thereby killing tens or even
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. This leads us to an alternative
concept according to which power is to be defined as “control over
outcomes” rather than “control over resources”.9 Since the use of
power capabilities is often restricted, which Palestinian actors try to
8
 Population is often considered as another important feature defining the power
capabilities at the disposal of an actor. Although Israel’s population outweighs
that of the Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, there is
hardly any other relevant power resource in which the gap between the Palestinian
and the Israeli sides is smaller, particularly since about one fifth of Israeli citizens
are Palestinians. This aspect will be discussed at the end of this paper.
9
 For a discussion of these two concepts of power see Michael Zürn 1992:
Interessen und Institutionen in der Internationalen Politik. Grundlegung und
Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes, Opladen: Leske und Budrich
[Interests und Institutions in International Politics. Foundation and Applications
of the Situation Structure Approach], Chapter 2.
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take advantage of in the present case by influencing the outcome to
a much higher degree than could be expected if Israel exerted all
resources at its disposal, the task of chapter 3 will be to examine
how exactly different Palestinian actors try, or could try, to constrain
Israel’s ability to use its different power capabilities.
3. Actual and Potential Palestinian Strategies to
Play the Power Game with Israel
As described in the last chapter, Israel is superior to the
Palestinian side in terms of power capabilities in at least four
major fields: armed forces, economy, diplomacy, and politics.
In principle, as mentioned in chapter 1, Palestinian strategies
to achieve a viable Palestinian state could be based on a radical
or a moderate approach. Recent actual Palestinian strategies to
achieve national independence do not cover the whole
theoretical spectrum. Yet, it is important to present the whole
spectrum, first, in order to understand why the actual Palestinian
spectrum is limited. Second, it may be discovered that some
potential options have been neglected in the actual Palestinian
struggle for national independence; such a finding could
contribute to chapter 4, focusing on possible future strategies
available to the Palestinians.
Which military, economic, diplomatic and political approaches
to achieve national independence are available to the Palestinians?
Although the Israeli-Palestinian case is unique in some respects,
in order to find an answer to this question, it may be helpful to
briefly outline different types of successful, radical as well as
moderate struggles for national independence in history.
3.1 Types of Successful Historical Movements for Independence
There have been few successful national struggles for independence
primarily based on a radical economic approach, meaning that the
colonized actor managed to achieve independence by countering
Martin Beck
19
or outweighing the economic potential of the colonial power. The
Dutch struggle for national independence in the 16th and 17th
century against Habsburg Spain seems to be such a case. Even as
the liberal Dutch provinces developed into a major center of
international trade, the “Holy Inquisition” inhibited economic
progress in Spain itself, thereby significantly contributing to the
fact that the Dutch people finally held the upper hand in one of the
longest independence wars in history (1568-1648). A moderate
variant of an economic approach significantly contributed to
Japanese independence. Being a poor, backward country in the
18th and early 19th century, Japan, although never a formal colony,
was exposed to imperialist American, English and French
penetration in the middle of the 19th century. Yet, through the “Meiji
Restoration” of 1868, the new Japanese leadership laid the
foundations for one of the most advanced economies worldwide,
thereby significantly contributing to substantial (rather than formal)
national independence, which could not even be shaken by the
disastrous Japanese defeat in World War II. Moreover, the success
of the American Declaration of Independence (1776), although
mainly a result of French intervention in favor of America, may
partly be traced back to an economic approach since England faced
difficulties (or displayed unwillingness) in directing as many of
its economic capabilities into its American colonies as would have
been necessary in order to counter the economic capabilities
developed by the Americans.
In terms of armed forces, there is hardly any successful case of a
national struggle for independence based on a radical strategy.
However, there are several examples of national independence
achieved as a result of “moderate” military struggles.10 The most
prominent Middle Eastern example is the Algerian War of
10
 It should be kept in mind that the term “moderate” only refers to the degree to
which the party seeking national independence is challenging the power
capabilities at the disposal of the adversary rather than to the degree of brutality
of the war.
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Independence. If France had brought all its military capabilities
to bear, it would have easily crushed the Algerian forces. The
reason why Algeria succeeded in achieving national independence
in 1962 was related to the fact that France got “tired” of
continuously wasting high military capabilities for a colony of
minor importance to its national interest.
There are few cases in history of successful struggles for national
independence based on a radical political strategy. Possibly, the
establishment of Slovenia as an independent state in 1991 is such
a case. To a higher degree than Croatia, even prior to independence,
Slovenia had developed many features of a democratic system
superior to the antiquated authoritarian regime in Belgrade.11 There
are many more cases of success in achieving independence as the
result of a moderate political approach, among them most of the
countries of the Fertile Crescent, including Syria, Lebanon, and
Israel, in addition to Egypt.12 These countries used the period of
external British and French penetration to develop relatively
sophisticated political structures superior to those imposed on them
by the imperialist power (but not superior to those in the
motherlands of the imperialist powers). In all cases, both
imperialist powers had to realize that efforts to counter national
self-determination would have been too cost-intensive.13
11
 The successful secession of Slovenia also heavily relied on the fact that Croatia,
which declared independence simultaneously with Slovenia, was of higher
importance to Yugoslavia, which is why Belgrade decided to concentrate on
preventing Croatia’s independence as well as the favorable diplomatic environment
with the European Union quickly welcoming Slovenian independence.
12
 As far as the Arab countries are concerned, I refer to substantial (rather than
formal) independence achieved only in the 1950s.
13
 In the case of Egypt, Great Britain, allied with France and Israel, finally learned
this lesson in the Suez War 1956 when the USA forced the military alliance to
withdraw its troops from the Sinai.
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The success of native South Africans in their struggle for national
independence can be considered as the result of a radical
diplomatic approach. Empowered by its people’s demographic
superiority, the African National Congress launched a campaign
demanding the implementation of basic principles of human
rights, thereby gradually isolating the apartheid regime on the
international level. Although Nelson Mandela had to negotiate
with a representative of the old regime, Frederik Willem de
Klerk, in 1990, the latter was placed on the defensive after
decades of diplomatic superiority vis-à-vis the liberation
movement. There are at least two sub-types of successful
moderate diplomatic approaches. First, they were usually the
result of major shifts in the distribution of power in the
international system, weakening the diplomatic position of a
state opposed to granting independence to an ethnic group.
Independence could thus be achieved as a result of peaceful
negotiations, as in the case of Slovakia, which became
independent in 1993. Yet, in some cases of international power
shifts, national independence could only be achieved by heavy
superpower support, as in the case of Taiwan, which was backed
by the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, or even in local wars, as in
the case of Croatia in the 1990s. In a second sub-type of
successful diplomatic approaches, the power shift was limited
to a local theater of war, such as in the case of Ireland in the
early 20th century. After an Anglo-Irish war leading to a painful
stalemate, in 1921 the parties concluded the “Anglo-Irish Treaty”,
which laid the foundation for the state of Ireland (at the same
time creating the North Ireland conflict, unsettled to date).
Table 1 gives an overview of the different types of successful
movements of independence discussed above, thereby stressing
the different power capabilities and the degree to which they
were used against the actor opposed to the granting of national
independence.
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Due to the huge power gap between Israel and the PLO, actual as
well as potential future strategies of the Palestinians are
predominantly moderate rather than radical. Thus, recent Palestinian
efforts to achieve a viable state focused on strategies aimed at
restricting Israel’s ability to use its superior power capabilities. Also
in the foreseeable future, the Palestinians are left with no reasonable
alternatives to adopting moderate rather than radical strategies. In
other words, all actual as well as reasonable future Palestinian
strategies attempt at reducing Israel’s control over outcomes rather
than to balance or even outweigh its resources.
3.2 Actual and Potential Palestinian Approaches to Achieving
National Independence
The question arises as to which strategies Palestinian actors have
recently pursued, and could possibly pursue in the future in order
to achieve national independence. In answering this question, the
four approaches presented above are applied to recent Palestinian
Radical Case Moderate Case
Employment Field
of Power Resources
Economic  Netherlands  Japan, (USA)
Armed Forces           -  Algeria
Politics  Slovenia  Fertile Crescent
Diplomatic  South Africa  Slovakia (negotiated)
 Croatia (accomplished
   after armed struggle)
 Taiwan (achieved through
   support of a superpower)
 Ireland (negotiated after
 a local war)
Table 1
Types of Successful Movements of Independence
Degree of Power
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history. The question will then be asked whether there are potential
strategies so far untested.
3.2.1 The Economic Approach
There have been few Palestinian efforts to copy the Japanese, not to
mention the Dutch way of gaining independence. This is hardly
surprising, since, contrary to the historic cases mentioned, Israeli
occupation between 1967 and 1993 directly and systematically
restricted the development of an autonomous Palestinian economy.
Thus, in the present case, growth in agriculture was curtailed by
expropriation and destruction of agrarian land as well as by a
discriminative water policy. Moreover, industrial growth was inhibited
by a restrictive licensing policy. Therefore, the growing Palestinian
labor force was mainly channeled into the Israeli economy, which is
why Palestinian welfare became dependent on Israeli migration policy.
With the beginning of the Oslo period, Israel’s contribution to the
impoverishment of the Palestinian economy became less direct.
Nonetheless, the closure policy significantly constrained Palestinian
chances for developing their economy.
The policy of the PA added to the economic problems of Palestine
among other things by establishing monopolies, thereby neglecting
some economic potentials. However, it is evident that the
Palestinians lack any real chance to challenge Israel’s superior
economic power. Even if Palestinian actors had worked hard on
the improvement of their economy in the Oslo period, it is a fair
assumption that opportunities were extremely limited.
Furthermore, there is no good reason to assume that the situation
will change in the foreseeable future. The Japanese and Dutch
way was and is therefore not a realistic perspective for Palestinians
in challenging Israel’s superior power capabilities. Although
occupation is cost-intensive for Israel since it binds resources and
manpower otherwise at its disposal for productive purposes,
Palestinians are not in a position to take advantage of this by
economic means since this would require that the Palestinian
economy generate surplus at least to a level where the economic
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resources at the disposal of the Palestinians in their struggle against
Israel meet the economic resources Israel is ready to spend for
occupation. Palestine is not capable of doing so, particularly since
its economy is highly dependent on Israel.14
3.2.2 The Military Approach
Military means were already used during the Oslo period (1993-
2000). There can be no doubt, however, that force and counter-
force reached a new quality with the start of Al Aqsa Intifada.
Although the common perception that most Palestinian military
actions are suicide attacks inside the heartland of Israel does not
stand up to an empirical scrutiny,15 this perception is anything but
surprising due to the outrage suicide attacks provoke among
Israelis and Western observers alike. Nevertheless, the analysis
should start with a brief examination of Palestinian military actions
in general before focusing on suicide attacks.
According to statistics supplied by the Israeli Defense Force, in
2002 the overwhelming majority of Palestinian armed attacks
took place in the Occupied Territories, particularly in the Gaza
Strip, and the clear majority of targets were military installations.
Thus, at first sight, the military approach of Al Aqsa Intifada
could be perceived as guerrilla warfare similar to some Latin
American cases as well as the Algerian movement for
independence. Therefore, the first question to answer is why
the Palestinian guerrilla attacks did not trigger an Israeli reaction
similar to France accepting Algerian independence after having
14
 Of course, the Palestinian leadership and people would be well advised to
make all efforts to improve their economy, but the positive repercussions of
improving the economy would not help much in the power game with Israel.
Perhaps this explains the otherwise surprising fact that the disastrous acceleration
of the Palestinian recession since the start of Al-Aqsa Intifada only plays a minor
role in public debates.
15
 See the statistics prepared by the Israeli Defense Force, available at:
http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/0104-1.stm, August 31, 2003.
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gotten “tired” of continuing the warfare. A first possible answer
is that such a reaction is just a matter of time. However, I believe
that structural dissimilarities between the cases of Algeria and
Palestine, which are hardly subject to change over time in the
foreseeable future, are the main reason for the different
outcomes. First of all, as will be argued further on, the Palestinian
strategy of suicide attacks strengthens Israel on the diplomatic
as well as the political level, thereby significantly reducing the
effectiveness of Palestinian guerrilla attacks. Second, although
the Palestinian and the Algerian cases share the feature of settler
colonialism, at least three major dissimilarities between the two
cases put the Palestinians at a comparative disadvantage to the
Algerians in the 1950s and 1960s. First, geographic proximity
makes occupation and settlement policy less cost-intensive to
Israel than it used to be to France. Second, compared to the
French-Algerian case, the awareness of a separation between
the “motherland” and the “colony” is less developed in the Israeli
society. This holds true primarily for the religious segment of
Jewish-Israeli society, which believes that major parts, if not all
of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, constitute the “Holy Land”
promised to them by God. Nonetheless, also many secular Israeli
Jews are only partially aware of the fact that many “Israeli
neighborhoods”, particularly in and around East Jerusalem, are
actually settlements. For instance, even among “liberal” Israeli
Jews only few would consider the so-called “French Hill”
neighborhood a settlement to be dismantled. Third, the Israeli
settlers’ movement is well organized and exerts major influence
on the government. When Baruch Goldstein carried out his
massacre, killing 29 innocent Palestinian civilians as they prayed
in the Mosque of Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi in Hebron in February
1994, an overwhelming majority of Israelis was outraged. The
forced disarmament of the fanatic settlers of Hebron and most
likely even further measures against the settlers in general would
therefore have been supported by a clear majority of Israelis
who in those days believed in the prospects of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. However, except for the establishment
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of the impotent “Temporary International Presence in Hebron”
(TIPH), nothing was done.16 Furthermore, when Yigal Amir
killed the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in
November 1995, the reaction of Binyamin Netanyahu, who was
elected Prime Minister only half a year later in May 1996, was
to pursue national unity rather than to isolate the influential
settlers’ movement:
“The criminal attack on Yitzhak Rabin has revealed in
full force one of the dangers menacing the openness of
a free society, primarily the danger of violence by
extremist individuals (…) We must fight them with all
legal means at our disposal. (…)
But in this campaign against those few extremists, we
must take care not to place collective blame on an entire
group loyal to the State, which carries out its laws. I
refer especially to the religious public, to the
communities living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, a public
which is today being subjected to harsh attack, whose
tremendous contribution in all areas of our life cannot
be doubted. Any attempt to exploit the tragedy to gain
political advantage and to incite against half the people
is, of course, fundamentally invalid. (…)
Especially after the tragic murder of Yitzhak Rabin —
may his memory be blessed — we must remember the
feeling of togetherness of one family; that is a basic
condition for our existence, and it is our obligation now
to make every effort to rehabilitate and strengthen it”.17
16
 Ilana Kass/Bard O’Neill 1997: The Deadly Embrace. The Impact of Israeli
and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process, Landham, Md.: University
Press of America, pp. 174-175.
17
 Binyamin Netanyahu 1995: Knesset Speech (Special Session in Memory of
Yitzhak Rabin, November 13, 1995), available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
go.asp?MFAH01hb0, September 2nd, 2003.
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I dare to speculate that the French people would have reacted
differently if an extremist affiliated with the “Pieds Noirs” had
killed French President Charles de Gaulle in 1960 or 1961 as a
reaction to his policy shift towards an “Algérie algérienne”.18
Contrary to France’s reaction to the Algerian struggle, the
Palestinian guerrilla attacks did not trigger Israel to grant
independence to the Palestinians. The major argument for this thesis
is closely related to the strategy of committing suicide attacks,
which strategically strengthen Israel on both the political and
diplomatic levels, as will be argued in the following paragraphs.
Since the present paper focuses on strategic rather than moral
issues, the primary task here is to understand the strategic
implications of suicide attacks. Yet, it is impossible to grasp the
strategic implications of suicide attacks without first,
understanding their moral perception in Israel as well as the
Western world,19 and second, grasping on which values this
perception is based. A short answer to this task is that suicide
attacks absolutely contradict basic standards of human rights
because they are deliberately committed for the main (or even
sole) aim of killing innocent people, i.e. non-combatants. In other
words, for those who believe in human rights, suicide attacks are
a crime against humanity. Moreover, since the value system of
human rights implies that these are not subject to a trade-off, you
are even not justified to kill innocents if you or your children
were the victims of a war crime or a crime against humanity. For
instance, even if your whole family was shot by a mass murderer,
you are not allowed to take revenge by killing one of his relatives;
18
 See also Roger Heacock 2003: Die Dialektik vertikaler Feindbilder [The
Dialectics of Vertical Foe Images], available at: http://www.birzeit.edu/research/
feindbilder.html, August 31, 2003.
19
 Of course, there is no reason to exclude Arabs from this perception by definition.
But due to the relative lack of power of the Arab world in international relations,
their perception is much less important in the attempt to grasp the strategic
implications of suicide attacks.
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moreover, you must not kill the mass-murderer himself except in
order to save the life of yourself or somebody else.
Note that the question of explaining why some Palestinian actors
resort to suicide attacks must be strictly separated from the
normative question of why they are strongly condemned by those
who believe in human rights. As I have argued elsewhere, I think
that part of the explanation for Palestinian suicide attacks is indeed
the Israeli occupation.20 However, rather than an explanation of
the roots of suicide attacks, the task of this paper is to discuss
their strategic impact on the Palestinian goal of achieving national
independence—and for this purpose a normative discussion of
suicide attacks is essential.
A preliminary result of the analysis presented so far is that, from
the perspective of those who base their moral values on the concept
of human rights (or who claim to do so), those Palestinians who
commit suicide attacks put themselves in the wrong.
Yet, sometimes Palestinians who share this argument seem to be
confused as to why the international community very strongly
condemns suicide attacks whereas often the very same
international community shows a higher degree of understanding
for Israeli military actions inflicting death on innocent Palestinians.
This is an important point because if Palestinian suicide attacks
and Israeli military operations resulting in the death of innocent
Palestinians were considered acts showing an equal degree of
barbarism, it could be expected that suicide attacks at least would
not harm the Palestinian diplomatic position vis-à-vis Israel. Why
are Palestinian suicide attacks and Israeli military operations
causing the death of innocent civilians perceived differently by
those whose value system is based on human rights?
20
 Martin Beck 2002: “Rationalismus, Ethik und Krieg. Zur Logik und Moral
der ‚ Operation Schutzschild’ im Frühjahr 2002” [Rationality, Ethics and War.
On the Logic and Morality of the Israeli ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ in Spring
2002], in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 31.4, pp. 457-458.
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At first glance, the different Western perception of Palestinian suicide
attacks and Israeli operations killing innocent people may seem to
be a case of moral double standards particularly since a highly reputed
international human rights organization like Amnesty International
states that many more Palestinian than Israeli children have been
killed in the course of Al Aqsa Intifada.21 However, although there
are numerous examples for the fact that the international community
applied moral double standards in the Israeli-Palestinian case, this
does not hold true in the case of suicide attacks. Let us take an extreme
example to clarify this argument. According to my view, and let us
assume this would be the view of all those whose value system is
based on human rights, the Israeli assassination of Salah Shehadeh
in July 2002 qualifies as a war crime for several reasons.22 First, as
mentioned above, according to international law, you are not justified
to kill even a mass murderer without according him a fair trial except
in self-defense. It is very questionable whether the Israeli argument,
according to which the killing of Shehadeh qualifies as a case of
self-defense because this was allegedly the only way to prevent him
from organizing further suicide attacks in Israel, is valid.23 Second,
even if this is the case, in killing Shehadeh, Israel caused the death
of several innocent lives: 14 people, among them 8 children, were
killed by the attack; since Shehadeh was in a residential dwelling,
the Israeli army must have anticipated that killing him would
inevitably cause death casualties of non-combatants due to the
massive bomb used in the operation. Yet, since each human life
21
 Amnesty International 2003: Israel and the Occupied Territories. An Ongoing
Human Rights Crisis, available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/iot_home, August 31, 2003.
22
 It seems appropriate to choose the killing of Shehadeh as a case study of
comparison rather than the massacre by Baruch Goldstein because, contrary to
the latter case, the former shares a major feature with the case of Palestinian
suicide attacks: Both suicide attacks and “targeted killings” are systematic
strategies carried out on countless occasions.
23
 See Ariel Sharon’s remarks on the Israeli strategy of “targeted killings” at a joint
press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair (November 1, 2001),
available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ko00, September 2nd, 2003.
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regardless of nationality has the same value, the Israeli action cannot
be justified even if it should hold true that doing so was the only
way to save some innocent Israeli lives.
Why then those who believe in human rights are more outraged
by a Palestinian suicide attack than by Israel’s killing of Shehadeh.
This is evident by a comparison of the following statements by
Human Rights Watch on Palestinian suicide attacks and the
“liquidation” of Shehadeh, respectively:
“The people who carry out suicide bombings are not
martyrs, they’re war criminals, and so are the people who
help to plan such attacks. The scale and systematic nature
of these attacks sets them apart from other abuses committed
in times of conflict. They clearly fall under the category of
crimes against humanity”.24 (Emphases added, M.B.)
“On July 23, 2002, fourteen civilians were killed and some
140 injured in the ‘liquidation’ of Hamas military leader
Salah Shehadeh. Eight of the fourteen were children. Israeli
political and military authorities had approved the
operation, which involved the dropping of a one-ton bomb
in a crowded civilian residential area, in violation of Israel’s
obligation under international humanitarian law to
minimize civilian casualties”.25
The answer to the question why the two cases are perceived
differently is that the basic logic of the Israeli action, although
not justified, was still related to a military purpose (at least it is
impossible to prove the contrary) whereas at least the main (if not
the only) purpose of a suicide attack in Israel is to kill innocent
people. Arguments sometimes put forward by those who attempt
24
 Kenneth Roth 2002, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, quoted from:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/isrl-pa1101.htm, August 31, 2003.
25
 Human Rights Watch 2003: Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip,
and Palestinian Authority Territories, available at: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/
mideast5.html, August 31, 2003.
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to defend suicide attacks (e.g. that due to mandatory conscription
as well as the reserve system of the Israeli army, all Israelis are
actual or potential soldiers) absolutely contradict the value system
of human rights (since, according to international law, even
soldiers are non-combatants unless they are on duty, not to mention
people who once were or might become soldiers in the future).
Also, any defense of suicide bombings based on the famous
“children’s question”: who was first in taking actions contradicting
standards of human rights and who “only” took revenge, is
meaningless if the value system of human rights is accepted.
Even those readers who do not share my argument (be it because
they do not share the value system of human rights, or because
they believe that I do not understand it properly) may possibly
benefit from it insofar as it may add to their understanding of the
strategic impact of suicide attacks. Whether one likes it or not,
the dominant perception of those whose value system is based on
human rights and who exert some influence in the international
system, i.e. some Western governmental and non-governmental
actors, runs along the lines delineated above.
Before the negative impact of suicide attacks for the Palestinian
struggle for independence is discussed in more detail, it should
be added that there would be—or at least would have been—a
potential chance for the Palestinians to avoid some of these
negative repercussions. The basic reason for this is that Palestinian
suicide attacks are committed by non-governmental political actors
rather than by the leadership of the PA whereas most Israeli
military actions resulting in the deaths of innocent Palestinians
are ordered by the Israeli government.
The independent investigation of Human Rights Watch comes to
conclusions contradicting the official Israeli positions.26 Although
26
 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002: The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior
Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel, Corruption and Crime,
available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0lom0, September 3rd, 2003
Prospects for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State
32
in the summary of the report, it is stated that “Arafat and the PA
could and should have taken [important steps] to prevent or deter
suicide bombings directed against civilians”,27 Arafat and the PA
leadership are not held responsible for planning, let alone
implementing suicide attacks, which is one of the reasons why
the Israeli ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, targeting among other
things the PA infrastructure, could not be considered a just war.28
The PA leadership did not succeed in benefiting from the fact that it
is not directly involved in suicide attacks, and this is largely due to
Israel’s superior diplomatic power, i.e. US tolerance if not support
for the policy of damaging the infrastructure of the PA and isolating
Arafat, who is allegedly “Israel’s Bin Laden.” Yet, apart from the
failure to take consistent action against suicide attacks in 2001 (i.e.
before Israel significantly restricted his options by carrying out
‘Operation Defensive Shield’), Arafat and his political elite bear joint
responsibility in the creation of such a desperate situation for the
Palestinians primarily for the following two reasons. First, Arafat
did not face the dramatic situation after the failure of the negotiations
of Camp David and Taba. He did not take action to develop a coherent
strategy for the period after Oslo, instead idly waiting for an
uncoordinated popular uprising to come. Second, the PA leadership
had established an authoritarian regime oppressing both criticism of
the PLO bargain with Israel in 1993 and opposition to the PA policy
in the 1990s in general. By doing so, Arafat significantly contributed
to the strengthening of political actors who believe that their main
feasible strategy in the power struggle both against Israel and the PA
is to use force against Israeli civilians, on the assumption that suicide
attacks weaken Israel (which does not hold true) and the PA alike
(which holds true). In the fourth section of this chapter, the Palestinian
problem of unused political potentials to challenge Israel’s power
superiority will be discussed in more detail.
27
 Human Rights Watch 2002: Erased in a Moment. Suicide Bombing Attacks
against Israeli Civilians, available at: www.hrw.org, August 31st, 2003.
28
 Martin Beck 2002:footnote 20, p. 454.
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The major strategic impact of suicide attacks is a devastating effect
for the Palestinians in the diplomatic game with Israel. Israel’s major
point of weakness on the diplomatic level is that occupation
contradicts international law. In other words, the major leverage point
for the Palestinian side on the diplomatic level is to insist that justice
be done. Yet, since suicide attacks are not justified, their use
significantly reduces the chances of obtaining international support
for Palestinian self-determination. By referring to the four types of
diplomatic approaches described at the beginning of this chapter, the
negative impact of suicide attacks on the Palestinian goal of achieving
national independence may become even more obvious. First, their
military impact on Israel is much too weak to hope for an outcome
resembling the Irish or Croatian way. Furthermore, suicide attacks
clearly diminish the opportunity to follow in the footsteps of the
Slovakians and the Taiwanese.
Since secular and Islamist groups organizing suicide attacks do not
care much for what they perceive as Western rather than truly global
concepts of justice, the normative aspect of the argumentation presented
here is meaningless to them. Rather, those who organize and support
suicide attacks might argue that their lesson from thirty-six years of
occupation is that there is no good reason to wait for the international
community to support the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel.
The logic of those who organize suicide attacks is based on the belief
that the only language Israel understands is force; as a result of terror,
it is believed that Israelis will tire of continuing the occupation.
However, such a strategy could only work if Israel were a classic
colonial power whose heartland were geographically and politically
distant from the Occupied Territories. Yet, as has been mentioned,
Palestine is not Algeria and Israel is not France. The reaction of the
Israeli government to suicide attacks is to strike back as hard as possible.
Moral restrictions on the use of its military capabilities against
Palestinian targets, although still significant (note that the organizers
of suicide attacks heavily rely on these moral restrictions, which may
be considered the most important ideological contradiction of their
approach), are increasingly reduced without triggering outrage in the
Israeli society. For instance, according to a report published by Human
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Rights Watch in May 2002, “during their incursion into the Jenin
refugee camp, Israeli forces committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war
crimes”.29 Nevertheless, in a poll conducted in June 2002, some 80%
of Jewish Israelis backed ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ during which
the incursion into the Jenin refugee camp was conducted.30
Instead of maximizing divisions in Israeli society, the policy of suicide
attacks actually unites it. Those who remain in the Israeli peace camp
find themselves on the defensive, many of them tearfully blaming the
Palestinians for forcing them to do what they claim to hate, namely to
oppress the Palestinian people. Thus, the strategy of committing suicide
attacks not only reduces Palestinian options at the diplomatic level,
but it is also devastating at the political level because it results in
confrontation with an increasingly united adversary.
Protagonists of suicide attacks claim that the resort to violence
triggered some phenomena of economic crisis in Israel. This
assertion actually holds true. Moreover, the strategy of suicide
attacks inflicts much more economic harm on Israel than any direct
economic option available to the Palestinians could ever do; although
the problems inflicted on tourism are of minor importance to the
advanced Israeli economy in general, the drastic decrease of foreign
investment constitutes a severe problem in the era of globalization.
However, the Israeli economic crisis is still manageable. Moreover,
in spring 2003, the Israeli leadership managed to implement some
adjustment reforms appreciated by the global market and the USA
proved to be ready to grant additional funds to Israel. Furthermore,
if Israeli development is compared to the Palestinian crisis, in which
29
 Human Rights Watch 2002: IDF Military Operations, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502-01.htm#P49_1774, August 31, 2003.
30
 Ephraim Ya’ar /Tamar Hermann (Tami Steinmetz Center) 2002: Peace Index
June 2002, available at:
http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindex/2002/files/june2002e.doc, August
31, 2003.
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the latter’s economy was brought to the edge of collapse, it becomes
once more obvious that the strategy of committing suicide attacks
inflicts more harm on the Palestinians themselves than on their
adversary, particularly since it failed to inflict nearly sufficient harm
on the Israeli economy to make Israel tired of occupation.
3.2.3 The Diplomatic Approach
At the latest when it embarked on the Oslo Peace Process, the
mainstream PLO (Fatah) decided to focus on achieving national
independence for the Palestinians by negotiating a Palestinian state
alongside Israel. With the failure of the negotiations of Camp David
and Taba in 2000 and 2001 however, the proponents of this approach
received a major blow. Although the PLO had accepted major
compromises in advance to the Oslo interim period, especially the
renunciation of all of historic Palestine controlled by Israel within the
1949 borders, and the recognition of Israel as a legitimate state in the
Middle East, Israel intensified occupation in the course of the 1990s
in major respects, especially by increasing settlements and restricting
the mobility of Palestinians. Thus, for the majority of Palestinians,
the positive achievements of the Peace Process were limited at best;
for many, the peace dividend was even negative. As a result, the
negotiation approach lost credibility among Palestinians, finally
resulting in the popular uprising labeled Al-Aqsa Intifada.
Even at the beginning of the Oslo Process, there could be few doubts
that the diplomatic approach had some structural limits. As holds true
for all four approaches discussed in this chapter, power resources
available to Palestinians are not sufficient to balance those at the
disposal of Israel. Moreover, as will be argued in the next sub-chapter,
the bargain of Oslo left the Palestinians with no leverage to push Israel
to compromise. In other words, it was always evident that the result
of Oslo would never be a truly fair deal with Israel, i.e. the
establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state on the whole of
the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel in 1967 or an arrangement
giving adequate compensation to the Palestinians in all aspects
deviating from this formula (those who might fault me for expressing
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a know-it-all attitude ten years after the fact may ask themselves
whether there was really any good cause in 1993 to believe that the
only reason why Israel did not immediately agree to a sovereign
Palestinian state on the whole of the Occupied Territories was that the
Israeli government headed by Yitzhak Rabin needed some time to
convince its people to accept such an agreement).
After the failure of the Oslo Peace Process and over two years of force
and counter-force in the period of Al Aqsa Intifada, for at least three
structural reasons, the perspectives for those Palestinian actors who
are still in favor of the diplomatic approach are much worse than they
had been before Israel and the PLO had agreed upon the Oslo Process.
As was argued in chapter 2, the major obstacles to achieving Palestinian
independence through negotiations with Israel are a lack of trust
between the actors, their orientation towards relative gains and the
power gap between Israel and the PLO. There can be few doubts that
trust between the parties diminished further with the failure of the Oslo
Peace Process (Palestinian perspective: we compromised in 1993
because we believed that the Israelis would also do so in the course of
the Peace Process, but they refrained from doing so and there is no
reason to assume that Israel will not play the same game once again if
we agree upon another peace process; Israeli perspective: instead of
sticking to the Peace Process, the Palestinians resorted to violence
against us again and there is no reason to believe that they will not do
this once more if we agree upon yet another peace process). There is
likewise an increasing tendency towards relative gains (Palestinian
perspective: the Israelis used their benefits from the Oslo Peace Process
to tighten up occupation and there is no reason to believe that they will
not continue to do so in the future if we agree once again upon a peace
process; Israeli perspective: the Palestinians used their benefits from
the Oslo Peace Process in order to develop terrorist structures
threatening our security and there is no reason to believe that they will
not continue to do so in the future if we once again agree upon a peace
process). It is also clear that the power gap between Israel and the
Palestinian side is even larger than at the start of the Oslo Peace Process
(especially on the diplomatic, economic and political level: the
Palestinian side lost credibility vis-à-vis Israel on the diplomatic level
due to the suicide attacks; the economic crisis of Palestine brought it
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on the edge of collapse whereas the Israeli economic crisis is
manageable; finally, the Israeli society and leadership is unified in the
fight against Al Aqsa Intifada whereas on the Palestinian side, the degree
of fragmentation of the political system is extremely high).
3.2.4 The Political Approach
The political approach played a major role in the history of the
Palestinians in their struggle for independence. The founding of the
PLO in 1964 and, much more importantly, the subsequent development
of a sophisticated organizational structure in the 1970s and 1980s
was a major reason why the Palestinian people managed to escape the
fate of other stateless people such as the Sahrawis. However, after the
establishment of the PA, a period which could have been used for
another move forward, the Palestinians failed to embark on the political
approach which would have involved promoting democratization.
As has already been mentioned, the Palestinian chances to embark on
the political approach are restricted by the Israeli occupation’s policy.
The authorities granted to the PA do not cover all crucial aspects of
sovereignty. Furthermore, the Israeli closure policy and the subsequent
direct financial support for the PA by the international community
made it very difficult for democratic actors to succeed against their
non-democratic adversaries inside the Palestinian political system.31
The potential of the political approach as compared to that of the
economic, is nonetheless much higher due to the fact that Palestine
enjoys some favorable pre-conditions for democratization. Many
Palestinians support basic democratic values such as freedom of
expression.32 Nevertheless, given the fact that the actual development
of the Palestinian system since 1993 took the path of authoritarianism,
I must postpone a further discussion of this aspect to chapter 4.
31
 Martin Beck 2000: “The External Dimension of Authoritarian Rule in Palestine”,
in: Journal of International Relations and Development 3.1, pp. 47-66.
32
 Khalil Shikaki 1996: “The Peace Process, National Reconstruction and the Transition
to Democracy in Palestine”, in: Journal of Palestine Studies 25.2, pp. 5-20.
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In what way does the democratic system of Israel in the borders of
1949 provide it with superior power capabilities vis-à-vis the
Palestinian authoritarian regime? The theorem shared by many
scholars that democracies are superior to authoritarian regimes in
terms of political effectiveness applies to the present case, as becomes
obvious by comparing the reaction of the Israeli and the Palestinian
systems to the failure of the negotiations at Camp David and Taba in
2000 and 2001 respectively. The failure of these negotiations, which
triggered a failure of the whole Oslo Peace Process, was a major
blow to the political ambitions of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
and Palestinian President Yasir Arafat alike. However, only the former
showed some leadership quality by successfully playing the “blame
game” through which he managed to convince the international
public that Arafat was solely responsible for the failure whereas
Arafat remained passive. Secondly, the Israeli government paved
the road for a major policy change by declaring the progress achieved
at Camp David and Taba null and void. Barak obviously did so in
order to give utmost flexibility to any future Israeli government to
exert its superior power capabilities against the PA and the Palestinian
people. On the Palestinian side, rather than facing the fact that the
difficult situation demanded a coherent new strategy, the leadership
just waited for things to come. When Al Aqsa Intifada erupted in
September 2000 as a popular uprising of the Palestinian people, who
had decided that they were no longer able to bear the hardships of
the deadlocked Peace Process and intensified occupation, contrary
to the Palestinian leadership, the Israeli political elite and public
were well prepared for a policy change. Finally, although Barak won
the “blame game” on the international level, he had to pay a high
price for the failure of Camp David and Taba on the national stage.
The Israeli people forced him to take political responsibility for the
failure of the Oslo Peace Process by voting him out of office whereas
the Palestinian system lacked the ability to adapt to the new situation
by producing a new coherent strategy and/or a fresh leadership,
thereby contributing to an unprecedented degree of fragmentation
of the Palestinian political system.
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It must be added that it was not only Israeli intransigence, made possible
by its superior power capabilities, which led to the failure of the Oslo
Peace Process. Also the Palestinian leadership must be held partially
responsible for this outcome. The argument for this thesis is not the
failure of the negotiations of Camp David and Taba which, given the
Israeli and Palestinian preferences, probably nobody is to blame for
since “[a] sober assessment of the summit would conclude that the
problems were extremely difficult given the demands of both sides (...)”
(emphasis added, M.B.).33 The PLO is co-responsible for the original
“defect architecture” of the Oslo Peace Accords. The diaspora PLO,
facing growing political competition from within the Occupied
Territories and being exposed to an existential crisis due to its
maneuvering behavior during the Gulf War of 1990/91 both on the
financial and the diplomatic level, signed an agreement which left the
Palestinian side with major strategic disadvantages vis-à-vis Israel.
Particularly, it turned out to be problematic for the Palestinian side that
Israel was recognized as a state whereas the Palestinian right of statehood
was not determined; additionally, all major issues, such as the problem
of settlements and sovereignty over Jerusalem, were postponed leaving
the Palestinian side without any leverage to push Israel to compromise:
“Indeed, the inside [i.e. Palestinian opposition to Israeli
occupation inside the occupied territories, M.B.] played
such a major role in the negotiations which followed in
Washington, that the Oslo accords can be seen as a response
of the outside [the PLO leadership in the Diaspora, M.B.]
to the challenge posed by the inside. (…) Israel was offered
a variety of things it had been incapable of obtaining in
Washington (most notably, postponing any discussion of
Jerusalem and settlements to the final status negotiations,
and not forbidding settlement expansion during the interim
period), and this is an important reason why Rabin chose
33
 Helga Baumgarten 2003: “The Myth of Camp David or the Distortion of the
Palestinian Narrative”. (Strategic Paper of the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of
International Studies (GIIS), Birzeit: Birzeit University, P.18.
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to sign with his enemy, Arafat and the PLO. This price paid
was heavy, in terms of serious errors on the part of the
Palestinian negotiators, errors which could partly and
perhaps largely have been avoided had there not been this
fundamental ignorance and mistrust of the inside on the
part of the outside”.34
To put it in a nutshell, the Oslo Accords were rational for the PLO
rather than for the Palestinian people. By signing the Oslo Accords,
the PLO achieved two major aims simultaneously. First, the
organization managed to overcome its severe financial crisis by
replacing its offended financiers from the Gulf with Western donors.35
Second, it regained political supremacy inside Palestine through the
establishment of the PA. Moreover, in the years to follow, the
leadership of the PA not only repressed all criticism of its bargain, but
also failed to prepare its people for the likelihood that, at least on the
basis of the Oslo Accords, the chances for arriving at a peace treaty
establishing a Palestinian state with full sovereignty over the whole
of the Occupied Territories was an illusory outcome of a future
negotiation process with Israel in view of its positions in the conflict
with the PLO and its superior power capabilities, which the PLO,
albeit implicitly, was ready to acknowledge by contract.
Table 2 (pp. 42-43) is intended to provide the reader with an overview
of actual strategies the Palestinians embarked on in recent history.
Moreover, potential alternatives, which the final chapter will discuss
in more detail, are summarized.
34
 Roger Heacock 2003: Locals and Returnees in the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA). A Historical Perspective, available at http://www.birzeit.edu/
research/locals.html, August 31st, 2003.
35
 Martin Beck 2000: “The PLO and the Peace Process in the Middle East”, in:
Palestinian Journal for Historical Studies (al-Majalla al-Filastiniya lil-Dirasat
at-Tarikhiya) 2.1, pp. 206-218.
Martin Beck
41
4. Future Potentials: A Comprehensive Approach
In recent history, Palestinians primarily embarked on two
approaches, a diplomatic and a military strategy, and both are
“moderate” according to the definition of chapter 1. Due to
the superior Israeli power resources, both strategies have
severe structural limits. Thus, the Oslo period, when
Palestinian political actors emphasized the diplomatic
approach, did not result in a viable Palestinian state. The same
is true of the period since the beginning of Al-Aqsa Intifada
in which one group of Palestinian actors pursued a diplomatic
strategy and another chose a military approach whereas a third
one tried the squaring of the circle by combining these two
strategies. Three different strategic recommendations may be
drawn from these findings. First, surrender; second, focusing
all forces towards one strategy; third, combining different
approaches in order to challenge Israel’s power in more than
one field, thereby generating synergetic effects.
Since the first strategy will be discussed briefly at the end of
this chapter, I will start by discussing the second. If my finding
holds true that pursuing the strategy of suicide attacks decreases
the chances of the diplomatic approach, from the perspective
of the protagonists of the diplomatic approach, focusing all
forces towards one approach would require the abandonment
of suicide attacks. The point of view of the protagonists of the
strategy of suicide attacks would be to stop wasting resources
by attempting to regain decreased international support for the
Palestinian case instead of recruiting as many suicide attackers
as possible in order to force Israel on its knees. The strategic
problem of the first point of view is that it is on the defensive
due to the fact that the achievements of the Oslo period are
very low. In some fields, the Israeli occupation continued as
before (e.g. Jerusalem); in other fields it was even tightened
up (e.g. settlement and closure policy). How could Palestinians
be convinced to embark once again on a peace process after
Prospects for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State
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the experience of the failure of Oslo unless Israel is ready to
compromise in advance, which is very unlikely to happen?
The strategic problem of the second point of view is that it
would be highly inefficient since contrary to the expectations
of its proponents, it would increase Israel’s willingness and
ability to use its superior military capabilities against the
Palestinians.
The logic of the third conclusion is that, due to the huge power
gap between Israel and the Palestinian side, the latter cannot
afford to waste any resources. Moreover, embarking on several
fields at the same time could trigger synergetic effects. If we
take the two major strategies pursued by the Palestinians in
recent history, the strategy of suicide attacks can be ruled out
since it is not compatible with an approach challenging Israel
on the political level, which is the main unused resource of
the Palestinians.
As has been argued in chapter 3, although there is also some
potential for Palestine to improve in terms of its economy, there
seems to be no real chance in the foreseeable future to reach a
situation in which Palestinians could challenge the economic
resources Israel is willing to expend in order to maintain
occupation. In the field of politics, however, the Palestinian
perspectives are less bleak. One of the main reasons why Israel
does not face major challenges in what could be the Israeli-
Palestinian political power game is that the Palestinian
Autonomous Territories did not develop democratic structures.
Although, as has been argued in chapter 1, the PA was never
put into the position of becoming a fully-fledged democratic
government, a democratic system covering the policies granted
to the PA could be embarked on. Such a system could challenge
Israel’s superior power position for two reasons. First, it would
be hard for Israel to defend occupation over a democracy vis-
à-vis the international community. Moreover, a democratic
Palestinian system would significantly reduce Israel’s lack of
trust towards the PA as well as its orientation towards relative
Martin Beck
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gains.36 Second, synergetic effects with a diplomatic approach
could be achieved. For instance, in a democratic system
strategies of civil disobedience against the Israeli occupation,
power could become more prominent, e.g. mass marches
crossing Israeli checkpoints taped by international media.
Moreover, democratic Palestine would be the prerequisite for
an open discussion of what painful sacrifices the Palestinian
society is ready to make in order to reach an agreement with
Israel, especially over the issue of refugees.
It should be added that not all kinds of Palestinian military actions
would have the same devastating effect on Palestinian power
capabilities on the diplomatic level. If a guerrilla tactic were
pursued to be limited to the infrastructure of Israel’s armed forces
as well as settlements in the Occupied Territories, with the probable
exception of the USA, there would be a reasonable chance of
convincing the international public that these acts are legitimate
acts of resistance. Moreover, and possibly more important, such
a strategy would weaken Israel at the political level. As has been
described above, the effect of suicide attacks on the Israeli society
is unification. Yet, if Palestinian military operations only targeted
the infrastructure of Israel’s armed forces and settlements, the
majority of Israelis, whose immediate benefit from occupation is
36
 Note that this assertion only holds true for the actual result of a process of
democratization, i.e. a consolidated Palestinian democracy. In other words, this
does not mean that Israel will necessarily welcome a process of democratization
in Palestine. Actually, there are numerous counter-examples. Paradoxically, the
main reason behind this has been mentioned in the first part of the argument put
forward above: a democratic Palestine would make it difficult for Israel to justify
major aspects of occupation that any (i.e. even a “moderate”) Israeli government
is interested in maintaining, particularly the control over (major parts of) East
Jerusalem, settlements close to the “Green Line” as well as a denial of the “right
of return”. Moreover, due to 36 years of occupation, a Palestinian democratization
process would not necessarily bring to power those in Palestine who would be
interested in consolidating such a process, which is why Israel cannot be sure
that a Palestinian process of democratization will result in a democracy.
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limited at best, might oppose a continuation of occupation
inflicting costs on the Israeli society as a whole.
As has been shown, much more promising strategies would be
available to the Palestinians than those currently pursued in order
to achieve national independence. However, it is rather unlikely
that they will be adopted. First, due to their lack of understanding
as to how the Israeli society works, protagonists of the strategy of
continued suicide attacks will hardly be convinced to alter their
policy. Second, due to the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, those
who are in favor of negotiated peace with Israel are on the
defensive since this strategy pursued for seven years (1993-2000)
failed and left the Palestinians without major benefits. At the same
time, Israel is not willing to eliminate major features of occupation
as an advanced concession in order to win the Palestinian trust
back. Third, after having proven in 1993 that its survival as an
institution and the imperative of regaining political supremacy
inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were its priorities rather
than the fate of the people, the Palestinian leadership was incapable
of pursuing the path of negotiating with Israel in an efficient way
in the course of the 1990s. Yet, there are no indicators to suggest
that the current Palestinian leadership could resign in the
foreseeable future (as Israel’s Labor Party under the leadership of
Ehud Barak was forced to do by the electorate). To make things
worse, no promising Palestinian leadership capable of doing a
better job seems to be available. Note that this fact is a result of
the development of an authoritarian system, whose leadership,
contrary to a democratic system, has the means to stifle the
development of an alternative.
Even if the Palestinian leadership should adopt a new
comprehensive strategy, focusing on negotiating peace with Israel
and the promotion of a process of democratization, there would
be no guarantee of success. The structure of the conflict as
described in chapter 2 shows that even under favorable conditions,
it would be difficult to achieve a viable Palestinian state through
negotiations. Due to Israel’s superiority in power terms, any
Martin Beck
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37
 This term was coined by Helga Baumgarten 1991: Palästina: Befreiung in den
Staat [Palestine: Liberation Into the State], Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
38
 Jenab Tutunji/Kamal Khaldi 1997: “A Binational State in Palestine. The Rational
Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis”, in: International Affairs
73.1, pp. 31-58.
negotiated peace with Israel will most probably be lacking in
justice if this is defined as full Israeli withdrawal from the
Palestinian Territories occupied in 1967, the establishment of a
Palestinian state without major constrictions on sovereignty, and
finally Israeli approval for the right of return.
Possibly, the naïve observer introduced at the beginning of this
paper may be disillusioned to a degree that he or she opts for
surrender vis-à-vis powerful Israel. This conclusion brings us back
to an idea that was popular among PLO leaders in the 1960s,
namely establishing a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state, thereby
exploiting the fact that Israel is more vulnerable in terms of the
size of its population than in any other field. Compared to the
basic approach of “Liberation into the State”,37 in these days the
perspective of a bi-national state, described as “The Rational
Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis” by Jenab
Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi,38 is only a utopian idea among some
Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals. Yet, imagine that all
Palestinians surrendered today to Israel, at the same time
demanding equal citizenship rights. What is a daydream for some
Palestinians and Israelis would be a nightmare for the
overwhelming majority of Israelis who believe in the compatibility
of Zionism and democracy. Thus, paradoxically, surrender could
be the only Palestinian strategy that might finally convince Israel
to accept - with no “ifs” and “buts” - a sovereign Palestinian state
in the whole of the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
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Samir Awad *
When offered the chance to be the discussant of this paper by
Professor Beck, I was intrigued, and I readily accepted  if only to
read something with such a novel approach.  The paper meets the
expectations and presents many interesting and pertinent
observations although it sometimes fails to take significant recent
developments into account, and could eventually use an update.
During the first few pages the scene is set, the model presented and
showed to apply to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As is the case
with game theorists, the author starts the paper by what is commonly
known as “putting the rabbit in the hat”. Clearly, such a trick is
needed if one is to consider the surprise or even bombshell that Dr.
Beck drops at the very end of the paper! This argument starts by
our “naïve” observer thinking that a Palestinian state would be
established in the foreseeable future and ends with an assertion
that “surrender” might be a realistic option for the Palestinians!
This structure begins with a mundane definitional debate,
distinguishing the concept of a state from that of a viable state
compatible with the realization of Palestinian self-determination.
The author abandons the former concept and adopts the latter,
although (on page3) he states that even a sovereign state on all
pre-1967-war borders “East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza
Strip (note the particular order of enumeration!) plus a land
corridor between them” is probably not going to be economically
viable. This should have been pursued further to conclude the
argument, noting for example that (especially now with the wall
that Israel is busily building) the idea of establishing a Palestinian
state that is economically viable in the WBGS is even more
doubtful, or that economic independence is not a crucial sine qua
non for a viable state. On the same page, the author questions
another concept (cultural viability) but ends the investigation as
soon as he begins it, pending the conclusion.
* Professor of Political Science, Birzeit University.
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Chapter 2 develops the positions, preferences, and potentials of
the two parties, Israel and the PLO. On page 6 the author suggests
that there would have to be conditions on the creation of a state,
and that the PLO would need to accept its demilitarization (which
they actually do) and on Israel seeking to improve its position
through better relations with the Arab world. At any rate, it is
here where the paper clearly engages the problem and sets the
rules of the game, correctly I might add.
The power asymmetry between the PLO and Israel encourages the
author to elevate the level of complexity of the conflict from one
compatible with an ordinary Prisoner’s Dilemma to Graduated
Prisoner’s Dilemma setting. The discussion in section 2.2 of the
pillars of Israeli power vis-à-vis the Palestinians carries with it a
sense of overkill. The “full” spectrum of options (military, economic,
diplomatic, and political) for the Palestinians are not mutually
exclusive and certainly not exhaustive, however, we are presented
with a bleak  picture for any policy maker on the Palestinian side,
let alone ordinary people. It remains to be seen whether other
resources (like popular will, a broad international solidarity
movement, or popular and civil asymmetric challenges, a favorable
international environment, etc.) should perhaps have been evoked
at least and not so easily overlooked. This is why, in my view, the
cases of the countries of the former U.S.S.R are not present in this
discussion. Although a number of assertions could be further
debated, developed and refined, the examples of international
independence movements are relevant and important, and they shed
the light on the methodology that professor Beck adopts.
I find the discussion of the “suicide attacks” particularly central
to this paper, but more importantly to the whole independence
of Palestine endeavor. I agree that this side of military action
undermine not only other fields of resistance especially the
political and diplomatic ones, but also international solidarity
with the PLO. Moreover, this activity managed to erode the moral
high ground that the Palestinian resistance maintained. The
examples that the author evokes to demonstrate the dissimilar
by Samir Awad
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impact of Israel killing Palestinian civilians (as with the
assassination of Salah Shehadeh) and Palestinian groups killing
Israeli civilians is accurate in general but not necessarily precise.
The case of Shehadeh could be explained along similar lines to
those the author used, however the Israeli army frequently
targeted civilians, and civilians alone. The discussion of the
diplomatic approach and the Palestinian side carrying the blame
of the failure of Camp David II is to be expected given the
favorable position that Israel has in the media, especially in the
US. An analyst of this phenomenon commented that the
American media could, if they wish, turn 180 degrees and make
Arafat smell of roses in two weeks.
The last chapter brings some excellent analysis and a surprise,
which is the relevance of surrender as an option to the Palestinians.
Without any doubt, the fourth chapter is an advocacy paper that
should be read and understood by everyone, even if the idea of
surrender is not tolerated by the reader. I must nonetheless remark
here on the fact that such a radical idea came up at the end of the
paper although mentioned in passing earlier on, and with a very
short discussion of less than one page. The argumentation therefore
is not convincing at face value (it should be discussed further,
perhaps in the future!). I think that this is an excellent paper with
sound methodology and valuable insights. Professor Beck should
be congratulated on his well-composed research as well as on the
approach itself.
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Let it first be said that Professor Martin Beck’s strategic paper is
exactly that. In other words, it represents what the Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod Institute of International Studies at Birzeit University had
intended in inaugurating this series: a clear, masterful, policy-
oriented piece of work, solidly based on critical analysis (and, in
this case, steeped in the theory of negotiations). As such, it should
be presented to all former, present and future negotiators on behalf
of the Palestinian people and their cause, as well as those on whose
behalf they are negotiating, and made required reading for them. In
that light, the rest of the commentary which follows might simply
be seen as an academic dialogue with the author, implying the
possibility that the paper might be tightened up, whittled down and
its internal balance very slightly modified before, like Machiavelli,
one considers submitting it to the Prince.
Professor Martin Beck shows in this paper that the options for the
Palestinians have been seriously reduced, to a certain but undeniable
extent because of their resort to suicide attacks. Had this ultimate
escalation not occurred, there might at least conceivably have been
a significant motivation on the Israeli side to move towards a
‘French’ decision (as in Algeria) finally to evacuate the Occupied
Territories. But, he says, the use of violence degenerated, on the
Palestinian side, into the evil and counterproductive tactic of suicide
attacks. Unfortunately, one cannot agree with this assessment,
because Israeli procrastination over carrying out their commitments
under the Oslo Accords, and moving finally to granting Palestinians
their statehood, was always attributed to armed (not necessarily
suicide) attacks that were allegedly to be feared from the Palestinians.
Moreover, before the Palestinians under occupation had resorted to
armed attacks of any sort, the refusal to contemplate self-
determination was justified by Israel in myriad ways that translated
into positions even less flexible than today’s and were always framed
* Professor of History, Birzeit University.
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in the discourse of security and the fight against terrorism. It might
be added here that, unlike the Algerians in the years 1954-1962
(who, incidentally, did not hesitate to resort to bombing campaigns
directed against French civilians), the purpose of the military
escalation by Palestinians during Al-Aqsa intifada has not been to
bring about a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied
territories. It has been rather in the nature of an attempt to deter
Israel from taking drastic military action against Palestinians. Of
course Israeli leaders define their own military actions in the same
way, except that they contradict their claim by stating that the
objective is to bring about the total defeat of the Palestinians. The
question whether or not, and in what conditions, certain strategies
exercise a deterrent effect, while others do not, would merit a much
longer discussion.
Professor Beck, at any rate, places more weight on ethical
considerations  (and they are patent) than strategic ones in his
discussion of suicide attacks.
“Yet, it is impossible to grasp the strategic implications
of suicide attacks without first, understanding their moral
perception in Israel as well as the Western world, and,
second, grasping on which values this perception is based.
A short answer to this task is that suicide attacks absolutely
contradict basic standards of human rights because they
are deliberately committed for the main (or even sole)
aim of killing innocent people, i.e. non-combatants. In
other words, for those who believe in human rights, suicide
attacks are a crime against humanity” (p.27).
Suicide attacks, in other words, are crimes against humanity when
they are directed against innocent civilians (perhaps not, or less so,
when they are carried out against military men). Let us take the
case of the two atomic bombs dropped by the US over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and which between them pulverized a quarter of a
million people, virtually all of them innocent civilians. Now, rare
are the mainstream commentators (Western political scientists) who
call these two bombings crimes against humanity. Why? Because
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the Japanese were all enemies of the United States? Because it was
hoped victory would thus be hastened? These two reasons, often
given by those who would justify the dropping of those bombs are
exactly the reasons given by those Palestinians who attempt to justify
the use of suicide attacks in certain cases. What is the difference?
Not, surely, that the US was fighting a just war, but that the
Palestinians are not. The difference is implicit in the above quote,
referring to “moral perception in Israel as well as the Western world”.
Americans in 1945 were Westerners. Palestinians in 2003 are not.
We can understand the thrust of Professor Beck’s arguments better if
we grasp the fact that he is an Idealist, in the Hegelian sense. His
universe, and his system of states and decision-makers, is a rational
one (in the sense that “the real is the rational and the rational is the
real”). It is basically a world of order and of movement, at the same
time, a world both Platonic and dialectical (ideas order the world,
which is in turn in a process of constant change, through the interaction
of opposites). Furthermore, at the top of his hierarchy of ideas stands
Justice. In this sense, he deviates from the Hegelian scheme, which
placed Freedom at the top (history, for Hegel, was the progressive
unveiling of the idea of freedom). This is why Beck devotes much of
his argument to a discussion of suicide bombings on the part of the
Palestinians, which he sees as incarnating evil (they are “crimes
against humanity”, he states). Israeli attacks are not as bad because
they only incidentally rather than systematically kill civilians, and
are thus indifferent to human life, but not criminally violating it to
the same degree. The reason it can be said with some degree of
certainty that Beck places justice ahead of freedom, is his constant
reference to Palestinian ‘suicide attacks’ (which violate justice). They
are mentioned 66 times in the course of his 36-page paper, or twice a
page, while the principal signifier of freedom, ‘democracy’, is referred
to seven times, or once every five pages. True, the more didactic
notion of “democratization” comes up 12 times, as a prescription for
improved chances in the confrontation with Israel, while the adjective
“democratic” comes up 17 times (mainly to deplore the lack of that
ingredient in present Palestinian political culture). Also, the term
“occupation”, likewise linked to (lack of) freedom, comes up 34 times
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in all. One might in this simplistic fashion conclude that justice is
twice as important for Beck as freedom.
In this idealist world, rational statesmen should seek rational
alternatives, if these exist, and they do, in one form or another,
because the world we live in is a rational one. We should therefore
look for alternative strategies, those adopted thus far having failed,
in the economic, military, diplomatic and political fields. After some
analysis of these four possible areas of action, in the course of which
he harnesses a variety of interesting historical examples to his cause,
he reaches the pessimistic conclusion that in none can much success
be achieved, largely because of suicide bombings, which make it
impossible to overcome the enormous asymmetry in all four areas
of conflict he has analyzed. Even more importantly, he feels that
the very fact of the asymmetry suggests the impossibility for the
Palestinians to achieve their proclaimed goal of an independent state
in the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel in June 1967.
He therefore comes to the conclusion, very popular today,
incidentally, among a certain brand of “radical” and cosmopolitan
intellectuals, that the Palestinians should give up on their dream of
an independent state. Being a political scientist, he has the courage
to name this move for what it would be: surrender. The demand
would of course be for a democratic non-denominational state, in
which Palestinians would exercise their democratic political rights
on a footing of equality with Israeli Jews. Unfortunately, it appears
very clearly that this Hegelian idealism does not adequately cover
the intricate realities of international life in general, nor of the Israeli-
Palestinian struggle in particular.
The fact of the matter is that one should, in the quest for a positive
outcome of the struggle, add to the idealism displayed by Professor
Beck, healthy doses of materialism and romanticism. The romantic
sensibility, by which is meant the dominance of emotions and the
passions rather than rationality, leads us to the following
consideration: Zionism exists, and has done so for more than a
century. Post-Zionism (in Israel) does not. We saw how quickly the
handful of its proponents (notably among the “new historians”)
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turned viciously on the Palestinians when  Al-Aqsa Intifada broke
out and before any suicide bombings had taken place). Any attempt
to “surrender” in the manner proposed by Dr. Azmi Bishara and his
disciples, who now include Martin Beck, is doomed to failure. One
wonders in this regard, why this essentially post-modern, post- (or
pre-) nationalist theory has come to the fore at a time when it is
clearly too late to propose it to the PLO leadership. When Professor
Sari Nuseibeh presented it (with a view, as he then specified, to
“highjacking the bus rather than just riding on it”) in the mid-nineteen
eighties, before the first intifada with its popular agenda relegated
it to the dustbin of history, he was reviled as a traitor.
The notion that Arabs would tomorrow make up half of the Israeli
population and two thirds a few decades later, places this option
outside of the realm of the possible. Israel and Israelis perfectly
well assume the burdens of the forced Bantustanization of the Arabs:
they have been practicing it since 1948 against their own minority,
and since 1967 against the populations of the occupied territories.
They are not daunted by the task. The Jewish nature of the State of
Israel is its only justification. Israelis are perfectly aware of their
original sin, the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948. If the Jewish
state they built on the basis of the expulsion were called into question,
then the original sin would alone remain. Adopting a healthy dose
of philosophical romanticism makes it possible, likewise, to
understand why the Palestinians cannot and will not surrender: if
they abandon their national cause in favor of a request to be treated
as regular Israeli citizens, they abandon what has become their
subjective identity, the struggle for self-determination. It is not
difficult to show that, in the political realm, domestic and
international, emotions may preside over decisions. George W.
Bush’s actions in the wake of September 11th, 2001, offer a prime
example of this. The proponents of the view that he was simply and
cold-bloodedly (rationally) carrying out the pre-established program
of the neo-conservatives in the United States (another very popular
theory nowadays) are missing a large part of the reality, and, I would
add, overestimating the difficulty of stopping the current American
expansionist drive in the Middle East.
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The other element that should be thrown into the analytical brew is
that of materialism. Power relationships, as Professor Beck correctly
states, define political outcomes, but only in the short term. Material
conditions my rapidly change, and these include, not only external
relationships of power (heavily asymmetrical in the Israeli-
Palestinian case for quite a time to come) but also internal
relationships in the various social formations that stand in
confrontation to one another. Israel is suffering enormously from
the three years of Al-Aqsa Intifada. The number of hungry and
unemployed people is constantly on the rise. The economic picture
is bleak, with little prospect for improvement, as long as this ongoing
struggle with the Palestinians lasts. In the short run, Sharon can
preserve his parliamentary majority through fear tactics and
blackmail (“They want to destroy us”), as he has done so skillfully
for the past two years. But in the longer run he, or his successor,
will need to search for new policies, in the interest of political
survival, given that the triple program he had promised the Israelis,
security, prosperity and peace (in the sense of the crushing of the
uprising) has failed miserably. Contrary to Professor Beck, I believe
that, although Palestinian society has suffered much more, it appears
to possess more internal cohesion, or at least resilience. It does not
have the habit of high consumption patterns which are those of the
Israelis, and its social structures, based on the extended family, have
so far preserved it from collapse. I could not agree more with
Professor Beck’s depiction of the Palestinian National Authority
and its leadership having simply sat around “idly waiting for an
uncoordinated popular uprising to come” (indeed I wish I could
make this brilliantly concise formulation my own), while continuing
to suffer from its built-in authoritarianism and lack of accountability
before its own people. This is in fact the main cause for pessimism
in the present context. The Palestinian people have shown that they
have the necessary resources, determination and intelligence to stay
the course. The forms of resistance they have adopted are of course
open for discussion at a variety of levels. But the main enemy of
the Palestinian cause is not the question of strategy and tactics, but
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rather than of dependence and leadership.
There is in the real world no such thing as an “ordinary” dilemma
(in which both protagonists can simply agree that they want ‘peace’)
as opposed to a “graduated” dilemma. In conflict, there are two
types of games: 1. zero-sum games (World War two) with one
winner, one loser, or 2. “graduated dilemmas”, based for their
resolution on compromise. At issue for the Palestinians and the
Israelis is whether they choose to opt for option one or option two,
and the issue of simultaneity in the opting. It will not do for one
party to opt for two even as the other has stuck to one. It is my
belief that ultimately, option two will be the simultaneous option of
the parties to this conflict. At that time, dusty draft agreements can
be taken out of the drawers, and signatures affixed to them, the
occupation will come to an end, and the question of the refugees
solved to their satisfaction. The ‘only’ question is: when? A
frightening question indeed, except for true believers.
In the meantime, Palestinians should take their ethical, political and
strategic decisions, not based on Western (and certainly not Israeli)
wishes: there have been too many bitter disappointments, and it is
hard to understand why there is as much pandering to the West in
the Palestinian Authority even today, when the Bush-Sharon duo
have nothing left to demonstrate by way of their identity of
objectives. This does not mean that one should ignore ethical
considerations and universal standards in making decisions. Indeed,
hundreds of Palestinians have spoken, written and signed petitions
against suicide bombings. But, when analyzing a society of the
periphery in its dealings with the awful weight of the all-powerful
center, the issue needs to be seen as a part of the overall process of
taking one’s destiny into one’s own hands, rather than as a necessary
response to Western demands. This is bound up with the further
development of a resolutely independent and democratic public
space within Palestinian society, without which the enormous
pressures of international, regional and local power centers cannot
be eased, and the stubborn paralysis that characterizes the current
situation is likely to be extended into the indefinite future.
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